. . . We Are the Living Proof . . . by Wilson, Ray
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 3 Article 11
Summer 1979
". . . We Are the Living Proof . . . "
Ray Wilson
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University
Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ray Wilson, ". . . We Are the Living Proof . . . ", 7 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 593 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol7/iss3/11
BOOK REVIEW
". WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF . . ." Second Edition. By David
Fogel.' Chicago: Anderson Publishing Co. 1979. Pp. xxi, 338. $10.95.
Reviewed by Ray Wilson2
Few proposals have had such an immediate impact upon state
legislatures as has the call for the abandonment of statutory indeter-
minacy in the sentencing of the criminal offender. Since the publi-
cation of the first edition of " . . . We are the Living Proof. . ."
in 1975, state legislatures in Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois,
and Maine have adopted variations of the proposals suggested by
the author.' Enactment of similar legislation in Florida during 1978
was thwarted only by gubernatorial veto.5 Other states and lesser
jurisdictions are addressing themselves to these considerations and
the entire issue of determinacy in the criminal justice process. Leg-
islation to bring specificity to parole board decision making has
been enacted by Congress as well as in Florida and Oregon.6 Sen-
tencing criteria have been established in several states, cities and
judicial circuits in an attempt to equalize the variations in criminal
sanctions within and across offense classifications.'
The disenchantment with indeterminacy, or with like sentencing
structures8 which permit wide variations between minimum and
maximum penalties, stems from several causes. The great expecta-
1. B.A. 1949, Brooklyn College; M.S.W. 1953, University of Minnesota; Ph.D 1968, Uni-
versity of California. Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle
Campus. Former Superintendent of Juvenile Hall and Director of Institutions, Marin County
(California) Probation Department; Commissioner, Minnesota State Department of Correc-
tions; and Executive Director, Illinois Law Enforcement Commission.
2. B.A. 1968, Loyola University; M.S. 1969, Florida State University. Staff director, Flor-
ida Senate Committee on Corrections, Probation and Parole.
3. D. FOGEL, ". . . WE. ARE THE LIVING PROOF..." (1975).
4. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701 to -709 (1978); 50 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.2
(West 1976); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-105 (1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1 to -7
(1977); IND. CODE §§ 35-50-1-1 to -6-6 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A, §§ 1251-1254 (1976).
5. Governor's veto message to Bruce Smathers, Secretary of State (June 22, 1978). (Avail-
able from the Joint Legislative Management Committee, Library Services Division, 701 Capi-
tol, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304.)
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976); FLA. STAT. § 947.165 (Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§
144.110-275 (1977).
7. See, e.g., 50 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.3-.6 (West 1976); MINN. STAT. §§ 244.09-10
(1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.775-.790 (1977). See also Interim Report of the Sentencing
Study Committee to the Florida Supreme Court (1979) (on file with the Florida Supreme
Court).
8. The author identifies no less than eight distinct types of sentencing schemes. D.
FOGEL," . . . WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF . . ." 193 (2d ed. 1979).
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tions were rooted as much in the desire to convince the captives, if
not the captors themselves, of the necessity of a moral and behav-
ioral turnaround as they were in the expiation of the debt owed
society. Largely they have remained unfulfilled. The precise mo-
ment at which this rehabilitation was to occur was left shrouded in
some Gnostic revelation. The inmate was hardly in a position to
know the release date as this became tantamount to knowing the
Millenium; it was apparently at hand but somehow had escaped
precise calculation.
The discovery of this magic moment was made the duty of the
clinician, personified in the several capacities of prison warden,
parole board member, psychiatrist, and, in contemporary parlance,
correctional counselor. The practice of corrections became analo-
gous to the practice of medicine. A curious blend of the scientific
and artistic came to characterize this newfound discipline of penol-
ogy and its allied social science disciplines. For each behavioral
disorder there was a therapeutic regimen to be followed, a pattern
of conduct to be emulated, and the ever-present threat of immediate
sanction to be invoked upon the slightest deviation from the pre-
scribed curriculum. The chronicle of early American penal history
presented by Fogel underscores how the jail on the secular level
came to reflect the primitive beliefs of the community on the reli-
gious level.' Incarceration as punishment became incarceration for
punishment, both in its early days of visceral sanctions and its later
days of therapeutic justifications.
Much in the vein of Robert Martinson's bibliographic foray into
the literature on correctional programs, 0 Fogel has concluded that
contemporary efforts at rehabilitation have fallen well below their
mark. This ingrained skepticism is reflected in his observation that
"[t]o date, no conclusive evidence has been presented in support
of the commonly held belief that a rehabilitative institutional pro-
gram of academic or vocational training is effective in reducing the
rate of recidivism among offenders."" But none of this is new to the
second edition, the failure of rehabilitative programs having been
the crux of Martinson's earlier review. 2 Nonetheless, little concen-
sus has developed on what does work, under what conditions it is
likely to work, and with what degree of reliability it can be expected
to affect in a positive manner the behavior of the involuntarily
confined.
9. Id. at 1-69.
10. Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 22 (1974).
11. D. FOGEL, supra note 8, at 114.
12. Martinson, supra note 10.
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Fogel's remedy for the above nonapplications and misapplica-
tions of rehabilitation is the development of a justice model for
corrections which will shift the focus from the processor/
administrator to that of the consumer/offender.' 3 Fairness and jus-
tice in the administration of penal sanctions are to replace the statu-
tory caprice of current practice. The model is to take the form of
legislatively prescribed sanctions of fixed duration, or flat time sent-
ences, reducible only through allowances for good behavior. Lati-
tude in the imposition of widely varying sentences is eliminated as
courts will henceforth be limited to selecting a sentence within a
much narrower range. Parole boards are reduced to insignificance
if not abolished.
What may prove troublesome to legislatures in accepting such a
justice model are the substantial philosophical and fiscal compro-
mises required. Philosophically, legislatures may be less willing to
champion such an innovative sentencing scheme which reduces the
duration of the maximum penalty available for particular offenses
in favor of certainty of confinement and fairness in release. How-
ever, certainty of confinement is more a product of the arrest and
prosecution of the offender than the logical consequence of a pro-
nouncement of the legislature. The decision of whether to prosecute
and upon what charge is sufficiently detached from the legislative
halls that a justice model, while intellectually appealing, is of little
practical significance, as plea negotiations easily undermine the
uniformity of its application. The discretionary application of jus-
tice is still vested with the prosecutor, even with this model. Discre-
tion has not been eliminated, it merely resides in a different setting.
Convincing legislatures that the appeal of the justice model is
worth the financial price poses another dilemma. The estimated
costs associated with similar proposals for Florida and California
have been placed in the hundreds of millions of dollars." Fogel
downplays such estimates noting that "[m]an-years and costs
under flat time sentencing can be significantly adjusted according
to the flat time sentencing scheme employed."' 5
The tremendous cost of flat time sentencing places the concept
at the mercy of economic cycles if not itself determining the eco-
nomic policy of the state. Nevertheless, mandatory minimum sen-
tences for certain crimes have become increasingly popular with
13. D. FOGEL, supra note 8, at 190.
14. Florida: Fla. S., Committee on Corrections, Probation and Parole, Staff Analysis and
economic statement on CS for HB 150 (Oct. 17, 1978) (on file with committee); California:
D. HOWARD, DETERMINATE SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA 26 (1978).
15. D. FOGEL, supra note 8, at 320.
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state legislatures. 6 In light of the projected costs, the author should
be content with the modest victory of moving at least part of the
discretion of sentencing from the courtroom to the committee room.
Legislatures are occasionally ahistorical creatures and the varia-
tions on the theme proposed in 1975 by Fogel are noteworthy, as
each of the enacting states has modified Fogel's original proposal. 7
The Maine and Illinois statutes still allow substantial judicial dis-
cretion in the imposition of varying flat terms whereas California
retains a decidedly rigid character in its imposition of sentences for
crime. Other state enactments share attributes of both.
To understand what determinate sentencing does represent, it is
important to realize what is does not represent. While it stands as
a vehicle for making the distribution of justice less variable, it is not
in the nature of institutions to surrender their prerogatives easily.
Enactments of the variety sought by Fogel may turn out to be more
tinged with rationality than infused with it as the purity of the
concept becomes so pruned with restrictive clauses and limiting
conditions that the constructive dialogue he wishes to undertake
may be frustrated from the very beginning. Moreover, his call for
correctional administration to "begin the development of an agenda
for dramatic change"'" asks a great deal from those very professions
where the gulf between the theoretical and the applied is wide, the
opinions divergent, the affection for the conventional endearing.
Having the legislature establish a uniform sentencing policy is the
substantial contribution made by Fogel and is one that is persua-
sively argued. But whether legislatures can function as the guardian
of the guardians remains an unanswered question since it presumes
that legislatures have established themselves as policy developers
rather than policy reactors. Fogel's catalogue of judicial decisions
clarifying the legal rights of the confined indicates that the legisla-
tive impetus for change may be considerably more reactive than
prospective. The evolving constitutional standards of minimal ac-
ceptability for prison systems are more a product of the judicial
than the legislative branch of government.
The quantum leap desired for qualitative improvement to obtain
a fair, just, and humane prison environment will have to confront
16. Florida has three mandatory minimum penalties: FLA. STAT. § 775.087 (1977) pre-
scribes a three year minimum term of imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the commission
of a felony; § 775.082(1l) (1977) prescribes a mandatory 25-year minimum sentence upon
conviction of a capital felony where life imprisonment is imposed; and recently enacted ch.
79.1, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 9-11 (West 1979) (to be codified as FLA. STAT. § 893.135) establishes
a minimum penalty scale from 3 to 25 years for possession of large quantities of controlled
substances.
17. D. FOGEL, supra note 8, at 264.
18. Id. at 281.
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and to successfully accommodate these competing quantitative
pressures which oftentimes require solutions to be tailored in more
traditional garb. And that is the challenge for the development of
the justice model for corrections: how to undertake meaningful
change in measured increments without being overcome by the
pressure to maintain therapy as the objective or being intimidated
by the potential fiscal and policy dilemmas which a radical depar-
ture from the existing system can cause.

